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Nationalism and media  
 
It is a curious paradox that while the two most influential books on nationalism in the past 30 
years, Imagined Communities and Banal Nationalism, both put media at the heart of their 
analyses, the relationship between media and nation has warranted relatively little attention 
from either scholars of the media or nationalism! On the one hand, nationalism scholars have 
generally tended to underplay, or, in some cases, overplay, the media’s influence, while 
showing little interest in wider theories of media and communications. On the other hand, 
media scholars rarely engage with debates within nationalism studies. Indeed, the most 
common approach, here, is to note, in passing, that nations are imagined communities before 
moving on to discuss other, presumably more important, matters.  
 
More recently, the rush to make sense of populist movements and parties has led to a lot of 
interesting observations about how fake news and misinformation fuel nativist resentment. 
But again, these studies generally don’t have much to say about nationalism, which is usually 
conflated with extremism. Some of these contemporary approaches will be addressed in due 
course, notably as they draw in wider debates concerning the impact of digital technologies 
on social solidarities and identities. But the first part of this paper will  outline how the 
relationship between media and nation was initially theorised, before  noting subsequent 
critiques and developments.   
 
Classic studies of nationalism 
 
The classic literature was vitally important for not only taking the study of nationalism 
seriously but also placing the rise of nations within a broader socio-economic and political 
context. In short, nations were seen as the outcome of particular (usually modern) historical 
processes and efforts were made to answer the key questions of what and when is the nation?  
Interestingly, the role of media in these broader processes was either largely ignored, as in the 
case of Kohn or Kedourie, or placed at the heart of any analysis as in the case of Deutsch or 
Anderson. Of those who emphasised the importance of media, it is also worth noting that 
there was a tendency to privilege structure or form over content. This can be most strongly 
seen in Gellner’s much-cited reflection on ‘the facility of modern communications’ (1993: 
126). He wrote; 
 
‘The media do not transmit an idea which happens to have been fed into them. It matters 
precious little what has been fed in to them: it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and 
importance of abstract, centralised, standardised, one to many communication, which itself 
automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism’ (ibid; 127) 
 
In media studies, a focus on the ways in which technologies shape human interactions and 
social structures is commonly labelled as ‘medium theory’. Closely associated with the 
pioneering work of Marshall McLuhan, these approaches challenge the idea that content 
should be front and centre when trying to assess the media’s influence, and, interestingly, 
find an echo in two classic studies of the nation by Karl Deutsch (1966) and Benedict 
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Anderson (1991). In Nationalism and Social Communication, Deutsch emphasises the 
significance of channels of communication, alongside the growth of markets, industries and 
towns, in allowing group members to ‘communicate more effectively, and over a wider range 
of subjects’ (1966: 97).  Anderson’s work is particularly interesting as not only is it the most 
cited study of nationalism of all time, it is also often used to support a view that privileges the 
importance of content or representations in firing the national imagination (See Skey, 2014a 
for a critique). Yet, as Sabina Mihelj (2011: 22-23) has argued, Imagined Communities says 
much more about the impact of  standardized and centralised facilities of communication that 
lead, in the case of print-capitalism, to the fixity of vernacular language and the shaping of 
temporal rhythms, both everyday and eventful.   
 
It is, perhaps, not surprising that the focus of these authors is on structures of communication 
given their wider association with an approach that seeks to locate the development and 
spread of nationalism as a feature of modernity. Beyond ethno-symbolist critiques of this 
modernist programme (which remain beyond the scope of this paper), it is worth flagging one 
or two other critical voices as they focus more specifically on the place and power of media. 
First, approaches that view technologies as the drivers of social change have been critiqued 
for offering a ‘one-size fits all’ model that fails to take into account the varying ways in 
which such facilities are utilised, adapted or, in some cases, rejected. For instance, at 
particular times and places, newspapers underpinned local, religious or class-based, rather 
than national, forms of community (Mihelj, 2011: 23-24), so we cannot simply assume that 
media ‘will automatically engender the core idea of nationalism’. In a related argument, 
Philip Schlesinger (1991) noted that many of the classic theories of nationalism conflated 
nation and state and, in the process, failed to observe the complexities of both socio-political 
and media landscapes in many parts of the world.  
 
A second key criticism was that content, of course, matters. As numerous empirical studies 
have demonstrated, what gets fed into the media is actually quite important, whether in 
relation to ordinary, eventful or crisis periods. In the first case, Billig’s (1995) Banal 
Nationalism, suggested that is often the most taken-for-granted features of media content that 
are crucial in representing both individual nations and a wider international order as normal 
and natural during routine periods. In the second instance, Dayan & Katz’s (1992) Media 
Events argued for the power of television in integrating (national) societies in profound 
moments of celebration or commemoration and pointed to the importance of their ‘semantic 
meaning; they speak of the greatness of the event’ (1992: 10, see also Skey, 2009). Finally, 
there are numerous studies which highlight the manner in which media content, and in 
particular news reporting, shifts during periods of crisis or conflict. Research in Europe 
(Mihelj et al, 2009), the Middle East (Nossek & Berkowitz, 2006) and the United States of 
America (Collins, 2004) all indicate that media outlets use much more hyperbolic and 
exclusionary language, designed to generate a distinct sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’, during these 
periods.   
 
This leads us on to a final criticism of the classic literature. When it comes to making sense 
of the relationship between media and nationalism, we hear a fair amount about what the 
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media does to people but almost nothing of what people do with media. A second wave of 
research, drawing directly on insights from the burgeoning field of audience or reception 
studies, sought to redress this balance.      
 
The discursive ‘turn’ 
 
In her book, Mediating the Nation (2005), Mirca Madianou drew a distinction between 
approaches that emphasis the power of the media in inculcating (Deutsch, 1966; Anderson, 
1991) and sustaining (Billig, 1995) a sense of national identity among the masses and those 
that focus attention on the ways in which culture shapes people’s responses to media. In the 
latter case, the key text is Liebes and Katz’s Export of Meaning (Liebes & Katz, 1993) a 
study of audience responses to the U.S. TV series Dallas. Focusing on groups in Israel, the 
United States, and Japan, it is argued that the show was ‘‘appropriated in different ways 
according to . . . ethnic and cultural background’’ (Madianou, 2005: 20).  Liebes and Katz’s 
work was part of a new wave of research within media studies (Seiter et al, 1989) that 
emphasised the critical reception of media texts and challenged the idea that viewers were 
passive consumers of the media. The tenets of reception studies also filtered through to 
research on the nation, with feminist scholars such as Lila Abu-Lhugod (2005) and Purnina 
Mankekar (1999) conducting research to show how gender, as well as ethnicity (Liebes & 
Katz, 1993) and class (Morley, 1980), shaped the ways in which audiences responded to 
narratives of nation.  
 
These studies were not only important in highlighting the diversity of experience within a 
given nation but also focused attention on questions of dominance and power. In relation to 
media, this meant thinking more critically about how the nation was represented and in 
whose interests. If the dominant vision of India was defined in terms of Hinduism and the 
caste system, how might Muslims and other marginalised groups construct their own 
narratives of belonging and community, whether national or otherwise? If Britishness was 
primarily articulated in relation to the mores and values of white, middle-class, men from 
England, what did that mean for ethnic minorities, women and those in other regions (Morley 
& Robins, 2001)? Asking these types of questions encouraged scholars to not simply assume 
that media operate as a unifying force but to investigate whether, and in what ways, the media 
might bring people together or alternatively generate further divisions within a given social 
setting (Skey, 2014, Skey et al, 2016).   
 
Such an approach was broadly in keeping with the discursive ‘turn’ underway in much of the 
social sciences at this time. Nations were no longer seen as stable and homogeneous entities, 
naturally-occurring ‘units of analysis’ that provide the basis for academic enquiry. Instead, 
they were increasingly conceptualised as discursive formations (Calhoun, 1997) or 
frameworks for ‘understanding and interpreting experience . . . [and] making sense of the 
world’ (Brubaker et al. 2006, p. 207). Some, such as Billig, argued that national frameworks 
still mattered and that the mass media remained crucial in underpinning them, primarily 
through the routine ways in which it framed stories in national terms and, in the process, 
addressed national audiences.  
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Alternatively, an influential, and rapidly growing body of work, argued that nations were not 
only contingent and contested but also becoming increasingly obsolete in an era defined by 
intensifying processes of globalisation. Scholars such as Anthony Giddens, Kenichi Ohmae, 
Robert Cooper and Ulrich Beck noted the growing interdependency of the global economy 
and the overpowering of borders by movements of people and products, and posited a new 
era of cosmopolitan relations. It’s perhaps not surprising to note that the media was often 
viewed as a key driver of globalisation (See Rantanen & Jiminez-Martinez, 2019, for an 
overview) whether in relation to the rise of global media corporations (Zhao & Chakravartty, 
2007), new types of hybrid media culture (Kraidy, 2005), the tastes of trans-national 
audiences (Aksoy & Robins, 2000) or the expanding networks of political activists (Bennett, 
2004). But it was the rapid spread and popularisation of a set of relatively novel 
communication technologies, built around the production and dissemination of digital data, 
that was seen to represent the greatest threat to the primacy of the nation, leading – so the 
argument went – to a new type of global, networked society (Castells, 2011).  
 
 
Nations in the digital age 
 
According to its most celebrated proponent, Manuel Castells, the contemporary era is defined 
by networks, and a network logic, built around the production and management of 
information, comes to overpower both traditional hierarchical structures (state, religion, 
political parties) and parochial forms of identity and solidarity. It’s perhaps not surprising to 
note that the nation-state features as one of the key losers in this transformation and that 
recent nationalist-populist uprisings are seen as a partial response to it. Interestingly, 
arguments concerning the power of the internet to underpin a new type of society, are not so 
far removed from those which, as we noted above, emphasise the mass media’s role in 
inculcating novel forms of national community and organisation. They have also been subject 
to similar critiques, notably that in viewing technologies as primary causal agents they ignore 
both individual agency and the wider socio-cultural contexts in which such technologies are 
developed, employed, enjoyed or rejected (Van Dijk, 1999).       
 
Beyond those who attribute epoch-defining properties to digital technologies, there are a 
number of other arguments worth noting when it comes to the place and status of the nation 
in a digital age. Many have pointed to the impact of the growing mobility of human 
populations in challenging national frameworks of meaning and practice (Karim, 2003, 
Rantanen, 2005). The primary focus has been on diasporic groups, who live in one country 
but maintain relations with another through family and/or cultural links, using a growing 
range of communication technologies (satellite television, mobile phones, email, VoIP). A 
number of brief points are worth making, here. First, as studies of ‘long-distance nationalism’ 
(Fuglerud, 1999) have argued, such groups may use media to actively promote national 
allegiances and priorities rather than undermine them. Second, while diasporic media do, of 
course, contribute to the growing complexity of many media landscapes their impact is often 
negligible beyond the communities that support them. Third, while they are seen to generate 
5 
 
‘critical distance’ among users (Aksoy & Robins, 2003), the challenge they represent to 
national frameworks is not always clear given that they often continue to define themselves in 
national terms (Boczkowski, 1999; Poblocki, 2001; Miller & Slater, 2000).  
 
Elsewhere, a second significant strand of research has emerged in relation to the recent rise, 
and political successes, of populist leaders and parties around the globe. Here, the argument 
is that digital media have had a central role in allowing previously insignificant groups to 
spread virulent and exclusionary nationalist rhetoric, thereby challenge more liberal 
narratives of national community and undermining established social and political institutions 
(Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016, Udupa, 2019). There is plentiful talk about the resurgence of 
nationalism and much concern about how to deal with these ‘new’ forms of nationalist 
sentiment (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018, Judis, 2018).  
 
Much of this work has been provocative, not least in highlighting the agency of media users 
in creating content (participation) and the shift towards more extreme claims and counter-
claims (polarization) in a media environment defined by information overload and the power 
of algorithms. Put simply, it is divisive, emotion-laden content that usually gets liked, shared 
and pushed. The problem, however, isn’t so much how these scholars discuss media, but how 
they understand nationalism. For example, Christian Fuchs’ (2018, 2020) recent books about 
nationalism and the internet focus on the political sphere and, more specifically, the activities 
of right-wing, authoritarian groups.  
 
This is a commonplace in studies of the ‘new’ nationalism in the west (Norris & Inglehart, 
2019)) but similar issues can also be found in relation to studies of digital nationalism in 
other non-western settings. For instance, much of the work on Chinese digital nationalism has 
tended to focus on more ‘extreme’ examples, such as online attacks against Japanese or 
Taiwanese ‘targets’ (Liu, 2006, Wu, 2007). Even Florian Schneider’s (2018) commendable 
book on China, which covers an impressive range of topics, including search, hyperlinks and 
regulation, still uses two extreme cases the Nanjing Massacre of 1937–1938 and 
contemporary disputes over islands in the East China Sea to showcase key arguments. 
Elsewhere, a recent study of cyber-nationalism in Pakistan focused on a terrorist attack on a 
school during a time of ‘national crisis’ (Kalim & Janjua, 2019). 
 
Now the problem, here, isn’t studying the links between nationalism and extremes per se, but 
only discussing nationalism in these terms. This is a critique that Billig directed at the 
academy and policy makers over two decades ago in the aforementioned Banal Nationalism. 
Reducing nationalism in this way matters for two crucial reasons. First, rather than simply 
viewing nationalism as an exclusionary political ideology it is much better understood as an 
established belief system, broadly accepted by many people around the globe, which suggests 
that; ‘the world is (and should be) divided into identifiable nations, that each person should 
belong to a nation, that an individual’s nationality has some influence on how they think and 
behave and also leads to some responsibilities and entitlements’ (Skey, 2011: 5). Second, the 
articulation of this idea cannot be simply reduced to the activities of right-wing politicians 
and drunken football fans. It is also about, for example, every day, seemingly innocuous, 
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conversations about holidays, food and sport (Skey & Antonsich, 2017). Just as importantly, 
the extreme outbursts only make sense in relation to the unremarkable stuff that seems to 
generate much less concern or interest (Skey & Antonsich, 2017a: 324-5).  So, what of this 
‘unremarkable stuff’? Is there any evidence that national frameworks routinely continue to 
inform online structures and content or are new forms of identification, solidarity and 
belonging coming to the fore?   
 
Where’s the evidence? 
 
When trying to make sense of the place of the nation in a digital era, ‘news’ seems like an 
obvious place to start. First, it represents a key plank in many of the original arguments 
around the significance of mass media to national imaginaries and, second, there is no doubt 
that digital technologies have fundamentally altered the ways in which news is collected, 
collated, presented and engaged with. In many parts of the world, the popularity of many 
traditional news sources has fallen dramatically and consumption practices have also 
transformed (Siles & Boczkowski, 2012). For instance, a number of studies (Boczkowski, 
2010, Soffer, 2013) have pointed to the impact of rolling news, time-shifting and video-on-
demand on the simultaneous consumption of media products, thereby undermining the link 
between ritualised forms of practice, and (national) imagination (Anderson, 1991). At the 
same time, much remains familiar in terms of journalistic practices (Sonwalkar, 2005), news 
content (Dimitrova et al, 2005; Berger, 2009, Hafez, 2007, Soffer, 2013) and audience 
preferences (d’Haenens et al, 2004; Tunstall, 2007).  As Guy Berger observes, ‘it would … 
appear that many news institutions in cyberspace still retain the character of prior media in 
regard to three features: preferencing local and national news, domesticating news about 
other countries, and reflecting imbalanced flows between First and Third World countries’ 
(2009).  
 
If we look beyond news to other types of content, it is not hard to find evidence for the 
continuing salience of nationally-inflected content and priorities across a range of media and 
locales. In relation to television, empirical studies have been conducted across a host of 
formats, and settings, including; soaps (Kumar, 2010, Munshi, 2012, Gamage, 2018, Negra et 
al, 2013), comedy (Medhurst, 2007; Perkins, 2010), drama (Dhoest, 2004a, Cetin, 2014), 
lifestyle (McElroy, 2008, Hutchings & Miazhevich, 2010).) and reality programmes (Dhoest, 
2004b, Volčič & Erjavec, 2015), documentaries (Roy, 2007, Roosvall, 2009) and sport 
(Tzanelli, 2004, Visacs, 2011). Even the rapid growth of over-the-top digital television 
platforms with a more global purview, such as Netflix and Amazon Prime, hasn’t necessarily 
diminished the salience of national frameworks (Lobato, 2019). Netflix, which looks to 
position itself as a global television internet company, often privileges locally-produced 
content alongside it’s big-budget US productions, has to contend with national-level 
regulations (quotas, obscenity laws and public service broadcasting protections) and has a 
restricted presence and appeal in many parts of the world (ibid: 144-161).   
 
When it comes to the activities of other large-scale commercial producers, the increasingly 
globalised flows in programmes, formats and genres around the world has been used to 
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evidence the emergence of a more global media culture. These connections are significant, 
not least in generating networks of media workers, but ‘cultural proximity’ (Straubhaar, 2007) 
is still an important factor in determining which products succeed in overseas markets. As 
Albert Moran has argued, in relation to TV formats, modifications are generally required to 
suit the preferences of audiences and the demands of regulators. As a result, the production, 
regulation and reception of these ‘global formats … continue[s] to be anchor[ed] … in the 
ongoing reality of the national’ (2009: 158).   
 
This argument is also borne out by studies into promotional culture, where marketing 
campaigns are often ‘localised’ to suit national preferences and mores (Zhou & Belk, 2004). 
Similarly, the literature on place branding has pointed to the ways in which nations are also 
being aggressively marketed on a global scale in order to attract inward investment and build 
political alliances (Kaneva, 2011, Anholt, 2016). Hosting and participating in mega events is 
a key plank within many of these campaigns and while such events are often global in nature, 
they are also generally framed in terms of competing nations operating within a taken-for-
granted international framework (Grix & Lee, 2013).  
    
The continuing salience of national frameworks to ‘legacy’ media such as television and 
advertising might not seem that surprising, but what of studies that focus more directly on 
digital technologies themselves? Research into the architecture of the internet is growing 
apace but tends to focus on technical issues. There is, however, a small body of work that has 
analysed  how certain features of the online world, such as domain names, hyperlinks and 
algorithms, continue to recreate national distinctions and ways of thinking (Halavais, 2000; 
Bharat et al, 2001; Dimitrova et al, 2003; Segev et al, 2007; Shlovski & Struthers, 2010, 
Szulc, 2017). Halavais’ (2000) ground-breaking study of hyperlinks, almost two decades ago, 
showed that most websites linked to others within the same country and these patterns have 
recently been confirmed by Schulz, in his work on Turkey and Poland (2016, 2017) and, in 
particular, Schneider (2018) in an extensive study of the Chinese digital environment. Indeed, 
Schneider’s work is also important at it offers more empirical evidence of algorithmic bias, 
whereby search engines provide different information to users depending on where they 
happen to be located. The biggest digital platforms, such as Google and Amazon, have 
country-specific versions (google.nl or amazon.co.uk) and often incorporate other features 
that are framed in national terms, such as the Google Doodle referencing national holidays or 
particular historical events. 
  
In the Chinese case, the state tightly regulates what users can and can’t see so that some 
specific search terms are banned and others carefully managed. For instance, searching 
Tiananmen Square on Baidu, the main Chinese search engines, produces very few results 
compared to a related search on Google (2018: 68-69). Early visions of a global network 
where users from around the world could effortlessly interact have, then proved, somewhat 
fanciful and in many cases it’s possible to talk of an online national ecosystem. China is the 
most obvious example of this, with state-regulated commercial organisations providing 
Chinese alternatives to all of the main US platforms. Russia is another example where ‘local’ 
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social networking sites such as Odnoklassniki and VKontakte continue to attract more users 
than the main ‘Western’ alternatives (Baran & Stock, 2015). 
 
Finally, while the topics of digital identity and community have generated an enormous body 
of literature (see Baym, 2015, for an overview), relatively little of this work has focused on 
the extent to which the practices of ordinary users may be informed by national categories, 
preferences and sensibilities (although see for Zhao et al, 2003; Kim & Yun, 2007; Sasada, 
2006; Mainsah, 2011; Bouvier, 2012, Soffer, 2013, Szulc, 2017, Trost, 2018, for noteworthy 
exceptions). This lacuna leads on to the final section of this paper, which offers a couple of 
brief reflections on how we might approach the relationship between media and nation in the 
future.   
 
Theorising and studying media nations and nationhood in the contemporary era 
 
This paper began by arguing that the relationship between media and nation has been 
neglected by scholars of both nationalism and the media. Books directly addressing this 
relationship can almost be counted on the fingers of one hand and while journal papers are 
more plentiful they are often limited by the ways in which they understand and/or theorise the 
nation. In broader terms, it appears that arguments made in the early 2000’s around the death 
of the nation seem to have been an over-exaggeration. This isn’t to suggest, however, that 
processes of globalisation haven’t had profound impacts on people’s everyday lives and, in 
particular, the ways in which they identify, and engage, with others. Therefore, what we 
require are theoretical approaches that are able to navigate a path between, on the one hand, 
theorising nations as contingent and contested while, on the other, exploring the ways in 
which they are treated as if they are real, concrete entities with a meaning and significance in 
numerous people’s lives (Skey, 2011: 9-21). In the latter case, we also need to actively 
investigate when, and why, national frameworks come to matter in relation to both routine 
interactions but also in moments of crisis or celebration. There is an established literature 
dealing with such everyday (practice theory, mundane reason, ethnomethodology, 
presentation of self, tacit knowledge, entitativity) and eventful (rituals, solidarity, emotions, 
affect) issues in a range of disciplines across the social sciences and scholars of nationalism 
should be encouraged to engage with these approaches in a much more concerted manner 
(Skey & Antonsich, 2017a).   
 
Likewise, those in media studies, need to move beyond Anderson’s celebrated aphorism to 
think more fruitfully about the ways in which research around, say, media practices, events, 
rituals and users, as well as affordances and affects, could open up new avenues for theory 
and research in relation to the nation.  Elsewhere, in terms of method, we now have available 
a range of naturally occurring data, including in the cases of media users, original posts, links, 
likes, comments, which could be productively exploited through a range of micro and macro 
perspectives from discourse and content to network analysis. Studies of big data are being 
used to inform analyses of gender, racism and social movements, why not nationalism 
beyond the standard stuff about Trump, Brexit and the Five-Star Movement?  
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Finally, there should be a greater interest in trying to bring these range of insights and 
features together to think more critically about how they continue (or otherwise) to inform a 
taken-for-granted understanding of the world as a world of nations. As I have argued before 
(Skey, 2014), making a distinction between the mediation of individual nations and the 
mediation of nationhood may offer a particularly productive way of theorising the continue 
power of nationalism in the contemporary era.  Individual news-stories, advertising 
campaigns or Weibo posts may offer fascinating insights into the ways in which a particular 
version of this or that nation is articulated, by whom and for what purposes. But these often 
frantic, sometimes ferocious, debates around national belonging and entitlement rarely 
challenge the legitimacy of nationalism as an established and, often taken-for-granted, 
framework for making sense of the world.  
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